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The day that I started really thinking about Exemplaria’s anniversary, the Washington Post ran a 
story from the International Botanical Congress with the lead-in: “Latin is a bit like a zombie: dead but 
still clamoring to get into our brains.”1 The botanists had just voted to name newly discovered species in 
English. This change in language policy is nothing short of a seismic epistemological change. It’s going to 
change the way we think about the world. It’s going to affect the linguistic politics of scholarship. It’s 
going to impact scientific teaching. It’s going to restructure the archives of scientific history. As such, it 
reminds us that other archives are changing around us all the time. And the zombie metaphor—
however much it has become a pop culture cliché—suggests that we might address the so-called 
opposition between surface and symptom as a problem of metaphor. If we change metaphors, the 
drama of opposition will change or even dissolve—and if we hit upon a successful metaphor, reality will 
change too, and with it the prospects for meaningful critique. 
I started thinking about zombies even before the botanists put the wooden stake through Latin. 
(that’s a mixed metaphor, I know, but that’s the point). In fact, the zombies ate my brain for reasons 
directly tied to Exemplaria’s so-called “anniversary problem.” Like the journal, I started life as a 
medievalist devoted to theory in 1989, having calculated that too many people were focused solely on 
theory and I’d rather do something cooler. One of my first graduate courses was the relatively new 
genre, “introduction to literary theory.” Now, almost every year, I face the challenge of teaching just 
such a course without turning into the walking dead. How do you teach this class in an era where 
publications entitled “death of” compete with those that promise “intro to”? and for students born well 
after 1989? To ward off the zombies, I tried most recently a book called Theory after Theory by Nicholas 
Birns (coincidentally, Birns just published an essay on Chaucer and Shakespeare in Exemplaria2). Birns 
defends the ongoing relevance of Foucault and Derrida by referring to “zombie categories”—categories 
no longer understood as originally meant, yet still in use, whose productive plurality can free us from 
the homogenizing march of time and ideas (65). 
Birns doesn’t delve deeply into the zombie metaphor, so I was curious to learn more about the 
scholarly framework that generated this passing comment. The footnote pointed to Ulrich Beck, a 
German sociologist, as the popularizer of the term “zombie category.” For Beck, the term refers to 
categories that are holding back sociological research—ideas no longer vital yet still organizing our 
thought (203). For Beck, the zombie has a mainly negative connotation. His prime example is “the 
family”—a category whose classical sense is still widely valued. That sense, though, does not correspond 
to almost anyone’s experience of family life. Beck writes: “Each person thinks that he or she will solve 
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the problems that their parents didn’t get right” (204). Beck also talks about “class”, “nation”, and other 
staples of social description.3 
Beck’s negative use of zombie, alongside Birns’s more positive take, raised two questions for 
me. First, I wondered if the zombie metaphor itself was a help or a hindrance to thinking about theory, 
archives, and all the issues embedded in “zombie Latin.” Second, I wondered if an unexamined notion of 
“archive” is holding us back in some way even as digitalization and data mining expand.  
The answers must be interrelated. On the “positive” side, thinking of “archive” as a “zombie 
category” does seem helpful. The “classical” sense of archives as dusty places with low light certainly 
persists in people’s minds, and is even highly valued. And this sense corresponds less and less to our 
experience of life with archives. Technology has changed them, even those that are not digitized. 
On the negative side, as anthropologist Edward Dutton has pointed out, the zombie metaphor 
includes death, not exactly a useful way to think about the life of the mind. The metaphor also implies 
that those who disagree with a particular idea are somehow possessed by evil. I agree that the “death” 
issue is a problem, although I wouldn’t go so far as Dutton to conclude that Beck’s metaphor is a 
“danger to scholarship” (189).4 If we take “death” as a metaphor for “fixed meaning”, zombie categories 
describe well the way in which terms circulate with assumed fixed meanings yet are used to describe 
situations that do not correspond to those fixed meanings. This is about the cognition of connotation. 
Archive—you may think of a room, holding things still. Maybe you think of Foucault. Maybe we all have 
slightly different thoughts. The point is: zombies are in the room unless we’re all having the same 
thought. 
Death-bound metaphors are a problem because the “dead” (the Middle Ages, literary theory…) 
get dismissed while “life” moves forward. Zombies are a great reminder that death isn’t necessarily 
permanent, quiet, or still. Latin does want to eat your brain, and that can be a good thing. “Theory is 
dead”, “the humanities are dying”…in this environment, the zombies can save us all.  
Some say that in the digital era, the archive is dead. If you can’t find it on Google, is it really 
worth finding? Has the archive been zombified? 
One of the clichés about zombies is that “they just keep coming,” no matter what you do. In this 
way, they link up with another enabling metaphor, the stutter. I’ve found myself hesitating to repeat 
myself on the stutter, since I’ve written about the idea a few times recently while thinking about 
translation and about editing.5 But then, the idea keeps returning. Which could be a good thing. So I am 
going to repeat myself, sort of, and not complete the idea, again. I’m going to quote Mireille Rosello, 
again. Rosello develops the stutter metaphor in her discussion of a Québecois novel entitled Chronoreg. 
She argues that when a sentence repeats in the story, the repetition installs a narrative stutter that 
creates queer time: discontinuous, non-linear, never complete (in the sense that ‘coming-out’ never 
ends). It’s easy to imagine the activities of editing and translation through Rosello’s description of the 
narrative stutter:  
‘The stutterer is both repeating and not repeating, because no repetition is complete, and 
because no statement is unique or ever completed;’ ‘no real “truth” ever replaces an old “lie;”’ 
‘[e]ach new version both includes the earlier ones and moves away from them, refusing to 
become the absolute reality of the narrative, building on the past while suggesting that it is 
always possible to go back, to have to start from scratch again.’6  
The stutter also describes the archival experience and even the “archive” as a concept. When we find 
materials in the archives, this is what we do: we repeat the text but can’t complete it, for it wasn’t 
complete in the first place. Archives are not repositories of stuff but structures that pre-shape the 
questions we can ask of them. These conditions become more complex as we negotiate the relations 
between physical and digital spaces. Each iteration (through publication in part or whole) creates 
creates a second (or third or fourth or however many) repetition. Each time, the recirculated form marks 
its source as incomplete. Relations between originals and copies become blurry, as new forms take the 
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place of their sources. The materials we touch daily—manuscript skins, printed books, keyboards, tablet 
screens—move both backward (as repetitions) and forward (as gestures toward completion). They trace 
a ‘stutter’, following and preceding other stutters. I think the stutter is especially important in the face 
of the rhetoric of ‘fullness’ and ‘completion’ that accompanies so many archival publishing projects.  
 
Archives themselves also stutter. Perhaps 
they always have, but today’s knowledge 
economy makes this trait literally audible. 
Spoken books stutter through the 
overcrowded airwaves and exhausted 
memory chips of aging laptops. An eery 
computer voice might “read” manuscripts 
scanned into the subscription-based archives 
of multi-national publishing companies. 
Archives themselves also stutter. We can read 
their surface—of age, size, location. We can 
read their symptoms, the deeply cultural and 
political ideologies that brought them into 
being, the traces of repressed and absent 
materials that were excluded or simply 
overlooked. We can read the surface against 
the depth, details against the grain of official 
purpose, recover contests over knowledge 
and contestatory knowledge. 
 
Archives themselves also stutter. Many no longer 
occupy a single space. They are places of depth 
dispersed across many surfaces. Having gathered 
together, they are now spreading through 
electricity and lithium mining. Where is that 
manuscript I saw? I think I left on the flash drive. 
Where is this essay published? 
Archives themselves also stutter. Their time 
keeps changing. A medieval manuscript had a 
past, now it has an uncharted future. When will 
it be written by OCR? What does “completion” 
look like? Will it exist until this happens? We 
may have to start from scratch. 
 
 
A “stutter” is a surface phenomenon, attached to symptomatic reading. It’s a pure repetition without 




We are probably hard wired to think through comparison—hence the ubiquity of metaphor in human 
language. Even when we strive for the literal, images and allusions invade. You just can’t stop them. In 
the “surface versus symptom” debate, metaphor itself emerged as the target of “bad reading.” As Leah 
Price put it most directly: “the bibliographical turn… look[s] less like a flight from reading than a war on 
metaphor.”7 In a clash of metaphoric displacements, some scholars have been championing the pristine 
surface (“just what it says”) against the deforming whorls of depths that only reflect back critics’ own 
deepest concerns. “Surface” though is itself a metaphor—for the literal, it seems, for this debate has not 
(yet) targeted the grain of the page or glass screen, the color of the ink or pixelations.  
 Metaphor is the basis of the possibility of theory and even critique. For me, theory is getting out 
of context in order to get deeper into it: you start mixing metaphors and then you extend them; when 
they start to really explain something, you’ve found theory. 
Zombies don’t talk, they moan. This metaphoric sound brings me back to the stutter. Thinking 
through audition underscores the visual myopia of so many other governing metaphors—like the 
graphs, maps, and trees required for “distance reading” (Franco Moretti). The stutter opens a different 
kind of vision. Donna Haraway links it to an embodied feminist ocularity that situates knowledge, that 
begins with the vulnerability of a specific location. The stutter, as an allegory of the “partly understood”, 
speaks in solidarity with the positive impossibility of knowing everything, with the refusal of what 
Haraway calls the ‘god-trick.’ Instead, a view, an utterance, from somewhere.8  
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Metaphors shape thought. The stutter and the zombie shape perhaps useful thoughts about 
archives, about the archive as a condition of our work and as a figure of time, about our relationships 
with the past, about our relationships with those relationships.  
Some other metaphors are also on my mind—neighborhoods, prayer wheels, avatars, mash-ups. 
The metaphors that I find most attractive collapse the dichotomy of surface and symptom; they just 
don’t function in that world.  
For me, the surface/symptom opposition is, on the face of it, deeply flawed.  
Having reached this fairly ambiguous conclusion, I’d like to end with a few statements of 
position: 
--I’m just not that into literary excellence 
--I hate the notion that we can “just read.” I spend much of my time convincing my students that 
they have already taken a stance. They just need to name it. 
--I like puzzles. I am an archivalist with no interest in restoration. 
 
Connected and disconnected. Superficial and deep. Critique, I don’t know. I would settle for a 
few explanations.  
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